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GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES-FINDINGS OF
FACT NOT BINDING WHEN BREACH ALLEGED
Plaintiff contracted with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to
construct a reactor testing station in Idaho. The contract gave the
contracting officer and the head of the AEC (or his representative, the
Board of Contract Appeals) authority to make findings of fact as to
"disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract."1
Plaintiff submitted various claims in accordance with this disputes
clause. Dissatisfied with the resulting administrative decisions, plaintiff brought an action in the Court of Claims for damages resulting from
alleged breach of contract by defendant. The subjects of the alleged
breach were the same as the claims presented under the disputes
clause. The case was referred to a trial Commissioner for the taking of
testimony and for a report. Defendant contended that the findings of
fact of the AEC Board of Contract Appeals were final and binding upon
the Court of Claims. Plaintiff maintained that an action for breach was
not a dispute "arising under the contract," and hence introduction of
de novo evidence before the Court of Claims was permissible. From
an order by the Trial Commissioner favorable to plaintiff, defendant
appealed. Held: Findings of fact by a duly authorized administrative
body are not final and binding upon the Court of Claims in an action
for breach of contract, even though the alleged breaching conduct was
the subject matter of a claim processed under the standard Disputes
clause of a government contract, and de novo evidence is admissible in
order for the Court of Claims to make an independent judicial decision
on the merits of the alleged breach. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v.
United States, 339 F.2d 606 (Ct. Cl. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 34,
U.S.L. WEEK 3072 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1965) (No. 440).
Prior to 1951 the Court of Claims had admitted de novo evidence to
determine whether the decision of a contracting officer or head of department had been arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial
evidence.' In that year, however, the United States Supreme Court
held in United States v. Wunderlich' that de novo evidence was only
admissible to determine whether the decision was fraudulent. Congress
I2 Utah

Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 606, 609 (Ct. C1. 1964).

Jaffe, JudicialReview: Question of Fact,69 HA v. L. REV. 1020, 1050-51 (1956).
3 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
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reacted by passing the Wunderlich Act,4 which provided that the administrative decision was "final and conclusive unless.., fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or... not supported by substantial evidence." The Court of
Claims interpreted the legislative intent in passing the Wunderlich Act
to authorize restoration of the Court of Claims' prior practice of admitting evidence de novo, and so held.- Again the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Claims, holding in United States v. Carlo Bianchi
& Co.' that the lower court was confined to the evidence admitted in
the administrative hearing.
The court in the principal case recognized that the findings of fact by
the AEC Board of Contract Appeals were relevant to both the claims
processed under the disputes clause and the breaches alleged in the
action before the court, and that the findings of fact were final and
binding upon the parties by the terms of the disputes clause. The
court, however, distinguished the situations on the basis of the remedies
sought. So long as plaintiff pursued the remedies provided for by the
contract it was dealing with questions of fact "arising under" the contract and therefore bound by the contract's terms; a suit for breach of
contract, on the other hand, dealt with questions of fact "relating to"
the contract, and was not binding upon the parties. The Supreme
Court's decision in Bianchi was thus distinguishable, as it related only
to matters within the disputes clause,7 i.e., to disputes "arising under"
the contract. Therefore Bianchi was not controlling, and the Court of
Claims concluded that it was "not bound by a finding of fact by the
Board of Contract Appeals even though that finding is relevant to 'a
dispute arising under the contract'."8 The Court of Claims' decision to
admit de novo evidence was based upon the "compelling reason" that
the original arbiter as well as the reviewing body were employees and
officers of defendant.
Limitation of the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions,
partially evolved to alleviate judicial backlog and to lessen costs of
litigation, requires that the reviewing court have confidence in the
468 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1958).
5Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 169 F. Supp. 514 (1959).
6373 U.S. 709 (1963).
7 [A111 disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be
decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within
30 days to the head of the department concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. 339 F.2d
at 610.
8Id. at 612.
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competence of the lower decision-making body. In decisions relating
to government contracts, conflicting approaches to the doctrine have
been developed by various courts.' The general policy of limited review, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Wunderlich and Bianchi
and supplemented by the Wunderlich Act, is followed in the district
and circuit courts." However, the Court of Claims has tended to
construe its scope of review broadly on the basis that administrative
procedures do not afford the contractor "his day in court.""
Article 15 of the contract in the principal case provided that "all
disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall
be decided by the contracting officer subject to... appeal... to the
head of department.., whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon
the parties thereto." (Emphasis added.) 2 Rejecting defendant's contention that the contracting officer has authority to make findings of
fact on all disputes, the court found that "The contract plainly limits
their authority to make such findings to 'disputes concerning questions
of fact arising under the contract' .... This," said the court, "means a
dispute over the rights of the parties given by the contract; it does not
mean a dispute over a violation [breach] of the contract."1 From this
the court concluded that adjudication of claims arising from alleged
breach of contract, not being within the authority of the contracting
officer or AEC Board of Contract Appeals to decide, requires admission
of de novo evidence in order to give to the contractor his guaranteed
day in court.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Davis repudiates the majority's
position, and is based upon a reading of the contract as a complete
document. Judge Davis would have the finality of the findings of fact
be determined by whether the contract provided for some form of relief
in regard to the claim; if relief is available to the contractor within
the contract provisions, then the contractor should be bound-in a
subsequent suit for breach-by the findings of fact arrived at in the
processing of his administrative claim. The dissent found this position
inescapable when the terms of the disputes clause, the phraseology of
the Wunderlich Act, the principle of Bianchi, and the doctrine of
9 Compare cases cited note 10 infra with those cited note 17 infra.
28E.g., Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1962) ; Hoffman v. United States, 276 F2d 199 (10th Cir. 1960) ; United States Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 910 (D. Ore. 1959) ; Mann Chem. Labs., Inc. v.
United States, 174 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1958).
1Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F2d 606, 611 (Ct. C. 1964).
12 Id. at 610.
isId.at 609-10.
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collateral estoppel were viewed in combination as expressing public
policy.
The reasoning of the Court of Claims in the principal case permits a
complaining contractor to obtain de novo determination of the merits of
his claim if exhaustion of his administrative remedies fails to fulfill his
expectations.' Yet the nature of the claim and its attendant facts
would be identical in both the administrative and judicial forums. To
allow redetermination of the claim merely by altering the pleadings
could hardly have been intended by Congress when it passed the
Wunderlich Act.
The decision in the principal case poses a problem for government
contractors in areas distant from Washington, D. C. The Court of
Claims sits only in the nation's capitol, and the great expense of transporting witnesses and exhibits to Washington for trial de novo before
the Court of Claims may often exceed the value of the available reconsideration. In addition, the contractor must bring his suit in the Court
of Claims if he seeks damages in excess of $10,000."
Despite extensive criticism, it has been said that Bianchi would
result-by threat of reversal-in improvements in agency procedural
standards." The effect of the principal case will be to negative some of
that threat. Nevertheless, the decision in the principal case is in accord
with past rulings of the Court of Claims, 7 and was anticipated. 8 Given
14 The ease with which this will be accomplished is demonstrated in a hypothetical
situation set forth in the opinion, id. at 611.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958). Inactions for lesser amounts the Court of Claims
and federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958).
16 Comment, United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.: Finality Under The Disputes
Clause, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 290, 299 (1964).
17 E.g., Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 169 F. Supp. 514
(1959) ; Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956).
18 Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administratlive Determinationof Government ContractDisputes, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 115
(1964). Cf. United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946), in which it was held
that the disputes clause applies to all disputes arising under the contract, and that a
contractor's claim in the Court of Claims was barred by his failure to appeal from the
adverse decision of the contracting officer. One author feels that, in view of the Holpuch decision,
it seems certain that the Supreme Court will not uphold the Court of Claims rule
that administrative fact findings are not binding on it in a breach of contract suit
when a case is presented under a finality clause clearly expressing an intent that
breach of contract claims be subject to such clause.
Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 39
LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 39, 76 (1964). The standard disputes clause used today is substantially the same as that used in Holpuch. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1958)
does not prohibit the use of the all-disputes clause of Holpuch; it merely prohibits finality from attaching to a decision on a question of law made under the disputes clause.
Compare the disputes clause in Holpuch, supra at 236, with that in Bianchi, 373 U.S.
709, 710 (1963).
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the premise that the Court of Claims does not wish to extend finality to
administrative findings of fact because of fears of lack of due process,
the obvious solution is to attack the underlying premise by raising the
administrative procedural standards to a level which the Court of
Claims will respect. 9

19 Cf. Schultz, supra note 18, at 134.

